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English Edition By  letter of  13  May  1976,  the President  of  the Council of the 
European  Communities  requested the European  Parliament,  pursuant to 
Article  54  of the  EEC  Treaty,  to deliver  an  opinion  on  the proposal 
from the  Commission  of  the European  communities to the Council for 
a  directive for  the coordination  of  laws,  regulations  and  administrative 
provisions  regarding collective  investment  undertakings  for transferable 
securities. 
On  25  May  1976  the  President  of  the European  Parliament  referred 
this proposal to the  Legal Affairs  committee as the  committee responsible 
and to the  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary Affairs for  its opinion. 
On  31  May  1976 the  Legal Affairs  Committee  appointed Lord Ardwick 
rapporteur. 
It considered this proposal at its meetings  of  20  September  1976, 
25  November  1976  and  20  January  1977. 
At  its meeting of  20  January  1977  the  committee  adopted  th~ motion 
for  a  resolution and  explanatory statement with  twelve  votes  in  favour 
and  one  abstention. 
Present  :  Si~CDerek Walker-Smith,  chairman;  Lord  Ardwick,  rapporteur~ 
Mr  Berkhouwer  (deputizing for  Mr  Pianta);  Mr  Broeksz,  Mr  De  Keersmaeker, 
.  I  . 
Mr  Lautenschlager,  Lord  Murray of Gravesend,  Mr  Mursch  (deputizing for 
Mr  Poher);  Sir Brandon  Rhys  Williams,  Mr  Riz,  Mr  Scelba,  Mr  Shaw  and 
Mr  Walkhoff. 
The  opinion of the  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary Affairs  is 
attached. 
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PE  46.460/ fin. A 
The  Legal Affairs  Committee hereby  submits  to the European  Parliament 
the following motion  for  a  resolution together with  explanatory statement  : 
MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
embodying  the opinion of the  E~ropean Parliament  on  the proposal  from 
the Commission of  the  European Communities  to the Council  for  a  directive 
coordinating the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative provisions  regarding 
collective investment undertakings  for  transferable securities 
The  European  Parliament, 
- having  regard to the proposal  from  the  Commission of the European 
Communities  to the Council
1
, 
- having been consulted by  the Council  pursuant to Article  54 of the 
EEC  Treaty  {Doc.  114/76), 
- having  regard to  the  report of the Legal Affairs  Committee  and the 
opinion of the Committee  on  Economic  and Monetary Affairs  {Doc. 532/76  ) , 
1.  Welcomes  the proposed directive as  a  necessary preliminary to the 
establishment of the  free  movement  of units of  CIUTS  within the 
Community]  ,.,. 
2.  Looks  forward  to being  consulted upon  the proposal  on which  the 
Commission  is currently working  for  a,directive specifically 
providing  for  increased  freedom  of  movement  of  such  units; 
3.  Notes,  however,  that the  co-ordination measures  contained in the 
proposed directive are  incomplete,  as  each  Member  State will  conti-
nue  to  apply its own  marketing  regulations  to units of  CIUTS  marketed 
on  its territory; 
1  OJ  No. Cl7l,  26.7.76,  p.l 
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PE  46.460/fin. 4.  Notes  that  no  provision  has  been  made  for  the  harmonization  of 
administrative  procedures; 
5.  Asks  the  Commission  to take  steps  to  study the  practices  adopted  in 
regard to  fees  and  charges,  which  are  not generally dealt with  in 
the  proposal; 
6.  Calls  upon  the  Commission,  pursuant  to the  second paragraph of 
Article  149 of  the  EEC  Treaty,  to  incorporate  the ·following 
amendments  in its proposal  : 
1"'. 
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TEXT PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES  l 
AMENDED TEXT 
Proposal  for  a  Council directive 
for  the  coordination of 
laws,  regulations  and  administrative provisions 
regarding collective  invesment  undertakings 
for  transferable- securities of the  open-ended  type 
Preamble  and  recitals  unchanged 
Article  l  Article  l 
1.  Member  States shall apply. the  1.  unchanged 
provisions  of this directLve to 
collective  investment  undertakings 
for  transferable securities  (CIUTS) 
situated within their territories. 
2.  Subject to provisions relating 
to the  movement  of capital and to 
Articles  55(1)  and  61(2)  of this 
directive,  a  Member  State shali not 
apply any provisions whatsoever to 
CIUTS  situated in another  Member 
State or  to the units  issued  by 
such  CIUTS. 
2.  Subject to its national 
E_rovisions  relating to the  move-
ment  of capital and to Articles 
55(1)  and  61(2)  of this directive 
Member  Sta.te  '.A'  .shall not apply 
any  provisions. t.o  CIUTS. situated 
in Member.State  'B'  which  market 
their units. in Member  State  'A', 
or to the units  issued  by such 
CIUTS. 
3.  Member  States may  apply to CIUTS  3.  Unchanged 
situated within their territories 
requirements whicr("are  stricter than 
or  addit.ional to those provided  in 
Article  5  et seq  of  this directive, 
provided that they are  of general 
application  and  do  not  conflict with 
the provisions  of  this_ directive. 
Articles  2-4  unchanged 
Article  5  Article  5 
1.  A  CIUTS  shall not  carry  on  1. 
activities  unless~it has  been 
authorized  by the  competent 
authorities.  Such  authorization 
shall be  valid for  all Member  States. 
A  CIUTS  shall not  carry on 
activities  unless it has  been 
author.ized  by the  competent 
authorities.  A  CIUTS  once 
authorized  may  operate  in all the 
Member  States without  further 
authorization. 
For  full  text,  see  OJ  No.  C  171,  26.7.1976,  p.  l 
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authorised if the  competent 
authorities have  approved the 
management  company,  the  fund  rules 
and the choice  of  depositary 
company.  An  investment  company shall 
only be  authorised if the competent 
authorities have  approved  both  the 
memorandum  and  arl:.icles  of association 
and  the  choice  of  depoH.iLary  company. 
unchanged 
3.  The  competent  authorities shall  3.  The  competent authorities shall 
not  authorise  a  CIUTS  if the direc-
tors of  the  management  company,  the 
investment  company  or the  depositary 
company  are not  of  good  repurte or 
are not  competent to carry out  their 
duties.  To  this end,  the  names  of 
the directors  of the  management 
company  and  of  the  investment  company 
and  of  every person  succeeding  them 
in the office shall be notified 
immediately to the competent 
authorities.  The  same  shall apply 
to the  directors of  the  depositary 
company,  unless  ·such  notification 
has  already been  given to other 
authorities  of the Member  States  in 
which  the  CIUTS  is situated. 
not  authorise  a  CIUTS  if the 
directors of the management  company, 
the  investment  company  or the 
depositary company are not  of  good 
repute  or  are not  competent to 
carry out their duties.  To this 
end,  the  names  of the directors 
of the  management  company  and  of 
the  investment  company  and  of every 
person  succeeding  them in the office 
shall be notified  immediately to 
the  competent authorities. The  same 
shall apply.to the directors of the 
depositary  company  (20 words  deleted). 
Articles  6  - 14  unchanged 
Article  15 
The  assets of  a  unit trust may 
not be  the  subject of any claim 
whatsoever by persons other than  the 
management  company  and  the;,. 'tlni  t 
holders. 
Article  15 
Only the  management  company  and·the 
unit holders  may  make  a  claim against 
the  assets of  a  unit trust. 
In all cases  claims  by the  manage- Unchanged 
ment  company or  the  unit holders  may  on, 
only be  satisfied  from  the  assets  of 
the  unit trust where  there  are· charges 
expressly attaching  to  these  assets  under 
under  the  law  or  the  fund  rules. 
Articles  16  - 26  unchanged 
Article  27  Article  27 
1.  A  CIUTS  shall not  invest  more  1. 
than  1~/a of  its assets  in units 
issued by  other  CIVTS. 
2.  Without  prejudice to paragraph  2. 
1  a  unit trust shall not  invest  more 
than  5%  of  its assets  in  the  units 
of other unit trusts managed  by the 
same  management  company  as  its own, 
and  in  such  cases chargingof  further 
costs  shall be  prohibited. 
- 8  -
unchanged 
Notwithstanding-paragraph 
1  a  unit trust shall not  inves~ 
more  than  15%  of  its assets  in the 
units of other unit trusts managed 
by the  same  management  company  as 
its own,  and  in  such cases charging 
of  further  costs  shall be prohibited. 
PE  46.460/fin. 3.  Subject to paragraph  2,  whenever  3.  unchanged 
a  CIUTS  invests part  of  its assets 
in the units of  another  CIUTS,  any 
charging  of  further  costs shall be 
shown  in the periodical reports 
referred to  in Article  31. 
Articles  28  - 29  unchanged 
Article  30  Article  30 
l.  The  limits provided  for  in  1.  unchanged 
Articles  25(2),  26(1)  and  (2)  and 
27(1)  and  (2)  may  be  excee.ded  on 
condition that  any  such  excess  stems 
from price variations  in the  asse"ts  . 
of  the  CIUTS,  the exercise by the  ,  ' 
CIUTS  of  subscription rights relating 
to securities making  up  its assets, 
or  from  a  contraction  in  size by the 
CIUTS,  and  on  condition  that  the  . 
total  value  of  the  excess  is  not 
more  than  10% of  the  value  of  the 
assets  of  the  CIUTS 
Article 31 
/''. 
l.  The  CIUTS  shall publish: 
- a  prospectus  and,  each  financial 
year, 
- an  annual  report 
- and  two half-yearly reports. 
2.  The  annual  and half-yearly 
reports  shall be  published  withi~ 
the  following  limits  from the  end 
of the period to which they refer: 
- 4  months  for  the  annual  report 
2.  Should the total value  of the 
excess  amount  at  any time  to more 
than  10%  of the value  of the 
assets  of the  CIUTS,  it shall be 
reduced to  10% within the  follow-
ing  six months: 
Article  31 
l.  unchanged 
2.  unchanged 
- 2  months  for  the half-yearly reports. 
3.  By  way  of  derogation  from 
paragraph  l,  the  CIUTS  shall not  be 
obliged to publish the half-yearly 
reports relating to the  second 
six-month  period  of the  financial 
year  if the  annual  report  for  that 
financial  year  is published  during 
the  two  month  period. 
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3.  By way  of  derogation from 
paragraph  1,  the  CIUTS  shall not  be 
obliged to publ.ish the half-yearly 
reports relating to the  second 
six-month period of the financial 
year  if the  annual report  for that 
financial  year  is published  during 
the  two  month  period which  is. 
prescribed for  the publication of 
the  second half-yearly report. 
PE  46.460/fin. Articles  32-35  unchanged 
Article  36 
1.  Member  States  shall specify the 
independent  persons  or the bodies 
whose  duty  it  is  to verify  the 
financial  tlatacon!:ained  i11lhe 
annual  reporl.s. 
Article 36 
1.  Member  States shall specify the 
independent  persons  or the  bodies 
whose  duty it is to inspect  and 
check the financial  data  contained 
in  the  annual  reports. 
2.  Each  annual report  shall indicate  2.  Unchanged 
precisely the person  or  body whose 
duty it is to verify the  financial 
data. 
l\rU.c]e1'!  37  - 40  unchanged 
Article 41  Article  41 
1.  A  CIUTS  shall not  borrow 
2.  Paragraph  1  notwithstanding, 
Member  States may  provide that the 
competent  authorities  may  permit: 
a)  CIUTS  to borrow  funds  up  to  l~lo 
of the  value  o~'their assets  for 
the repurchase  or  redemption  of 
their units  o:t .for  the  exercise 
of  subscription rights,  on 
condition that  the  funds  borrowed 
are  repaid within  ~ short  period 
and  are  not  secured  by  a  charge 
on  the  assets  of  the  CIUTS 
b)  investment  companies  to  borrow 
funds  to acquire  buildings which 
are necessary  in order to carry on 
their business. 
1.  unchanged 
2.  Paragraph  1  notwithstanding, 
Member  States may provide that the 
competent  authorities may permit: 
a)  CIUTS  to borrow  funds  up to  1~ 
of  the value  of their assets 
for  the  repurchase  or redemption 
of  thei:r::  units .o:r::  £cu:.._the .. 
exercise  of. subsctipt.ion. r.ight.a,. 
or  for .the .purchase. of .£orei.qn.._. 
currency  in order to purchase 
foreign  securities,  on  condition 
that the  funds  borrowed.are 
repaid within  a  short period 
and  are  not  secured  by  a  charge 
on  the  assets  of the  CIUTS 
b)  investment  companies  ..  to borrow 
funds  to acquire such  buildings 
as  are strictly necessary for 
them  in order to carry on  their 
business. 
Articles 42-49  unchanged 
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The  following  persons: 
- the  management  company  and  the 
depositary company; 
- the  directors  and  staff of  these 
companies  or  of  the  investment 
company; 
- subsidiaries of the  management 
company  or  depositary company; 
- the  investment  advisers  of the 
management  company,  the  investment 
company,  or the  depositary 
company; 
- any  pe~sons holding  more  than  lO~ 
of  the  voting  rights  in  the 
management  company,  investment 
company  or  depositary company, 
shall not  act  as  a  party to trans-
actions effected  on  behalf  of  a 
CIUTS  unless  such  transactions 
concern transferable securities 
and  are carried out: 
a)  at  a  pr.ice which  is equal to or 
more  advantageous  for  the unit-
holders than the price of the 
official quotation of  a  stock 
. exchange,  if the transferable 
securities  involved have  been 
admitted  to  its  quotation~ 
,..  ..  · 
Article  50 
The  following  persons: 
- the  management  company  and  the 
depositary company; 
- the  directors  and  staff of these 
companies  or  of the  investment 
company; 
- subsidiaries of the  management 
company  or  depositary company; 
- the  investment  advisers  of  the 
management  company,  the  investment 
company,  or  the  depositary 
company; 
- any  persons holding more  than  1~~ 
of  the voting rights  in the 
management  company,  investment 
company  or  depositary company, 
shall not  directly or  indirectly 
act  as  a  party to transactions 
effected  on  behalf  of  a  CIUTS  unless 
such  transactions concern transferable 
secur.ities  and  are  carried out: 
a)  u-cchanged 
b)  at  a  price which  is equal to or  b)  unchanged 
more  advantageous  for  the  unit-
holders than that  observed  on  any 
other  regulated  market  which  operates 
regularly and  is recognised.and  open 
to the  public,  if the transferable 
securities  involved have  been  traded 
on  this market; 
c)  at  the  price calculated  in  c)  unchanged 
accordance with  regulations  laid 
down·by the  fund  rules  or  the 
memorandum  and  articles of 
association  of the  investment 
company  in the case  of transferable 
securities other  than those  referred 
to  in  subparagraphs  a)•  and  b); 
d)  at the  issue price to the public  d)  unchanged 
in  the case  of  new  issues  in respect 
of which  the  depositary company acts 
as  an  intermediary. 
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Article  54  Article  54 
1.  If  a  CIUTS  intends  to market  its  l. 
units  in  a  Member  State other  than 
that  in which  it is situated,  it 
By way  of  derogation.from 
Article  1(2),  a  Member  State may 
apply its own  marketing  regulati_ons 
to CIUTS  situated  in other Member 
States  and  marketing  or  intending 
.to market  their units  in its 
territory. 
shall notify such  intention to the 
competent  authorities as well  as the 
authori.ties  of the. other.  Member. .State. 
2.  In the case referred to  in para-
graph  1,  the  CIUTS  must  possess 
financial facilities  in the  other 
Member  State  through which  the unit-
holders  may  exercise their rights. 
Article  55 
l.  By way  of  derogation  from 
Article  1(2),  a  Member  State may 
apply its  awn  rnar.keting. regulations 
·to  CIUTS  situated  in other  Member 
States  and  marketing  or  intending 
to market  their units  in  its 
territory. 
2.  For the purposes of paragraph 
1,  the term  "marketing regulations" 
shall cover  mainly: 
a)  the rules relating to entries in 
.trade registers; 
b)  the  rules relating to sales 
promotion; 
c)  the rules relating to unfair 
competition; 
d)  the rules relating to canvassing 
or  other  marketing  techniques; 
e)  the  rules  governing  the various 
forms  of  savings  plan. 
2.  For  the purposes  of  paragraph 
l.  the term "marketing regulations" 
shall cover  mainly: 
a)  the rules relating to entries  in. 
trade registers; 
b)  the rules relating to sales 
pr  arnot ion; 
c)  the rules relating. to unfair 
c orn.12et it  ion; 
d)  the rules relating to  canvassi~g 
or  other  marketing  techniques; 
e)  the rules governing  the various 
forms  of  savings Elan. 
3.  The  marketing regulations ref-
erred to  in Earagraph  1  shall be 
applied  in  a  non~discriminatory 
manner  and  must  not have  the effect 
of  imposing  on  CIUTS  situated  in 
other  Member  States stricter con-
ditions  than  those  envisaged  in 
this directive. 
Article  55 
l.  If a  CIUTS  intends  to  markets  ita 
units  in  a  Member  State other.than 
that  ~n which  ~t. is situated,  it 
shall_ notHy such  ~ntent~on to the 
corn etent authorities as well as  the 
authorities  of the  other Me  er 
State. 
2.  In the case referred.to in  para~ 
graph  1,  the  CIUTS  must  possess 
financial facilities  in the  other 
Member  State through which the unit-
holders  may  exercise their rights. 
12- PE  46. 460ffin, 3.  The  marketing  regulations ref-
erred to  in paragraph  1  shall be 
applied  in  a  non-discriminatory 
manner  and  must  not have the effect 
of  imposing  on  CIUTS  situated in 
other  Member  States stricter con-
ditions  than  those  envisaged  in 
this directive. 
3.  deleted 
Articles  56-7~,un~hanged 
Article  72 
Member  States shall ensure that 
the  Commission  is notified of  the 
text of  essential provisions 
subsequently adopted  under  national 
law  in the fields  covered  by this 
directive. 
Article  72 
Member  States shall ensure that 
the Commission .  .is .naf:.ilied  of the 
text  of essential provisions which. 
they  intend to adopt .or  adopt 
under  national  law  in the  fields 
covered  by this directive. 
Article  73  unchanged 
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EXPLANATORY  STATEMENT 
I.  BACKGROUND  TO  THE  PROPOSAL 
1.  During  the past  ten  years,  mutual  Funds  in  Europe  and  the United 
states have  become  an  important  factor  in  long-term  investment  markets. 
The  structure of  the Funds  differs  from  one  country to another,  but all 
have  a  variable capital structure,  with capital waxing  as  sales  increase 
and waning  as  redemptions  increase.  These  collective  investment 
undertakings  (CIUTS)  gather the funds  of  as  many  savers as possible 
by  issuing units.  The  funds  thus  obtained are  invested  in securities 
or  other assets  on  the  principle of  risk spreading.  The  unit price, 
usually calculated each  day,  is  obtained  by dividing  the  net  asset 
value  of  the  port folio  l.Jy  t-.hc  number  of  units  in  issue.  The  dividends 
on  the  investments  of  the  Fund  are distributed to holders  in accordance 
with the  size  of their holdings. 
2.  These  institutions offer savers the  advantages  of  a  wide. spreaa 
of  investments  made  after  experts have carried out  careful comparisons, 
which would  often  be  difficult for  the  individual  saver to make, 
particularly comparisons  of the  opportunities presented  in  foreign 
markets.  Units  are  marketed  by  means  of  offers to the  public,  often 
directed at  small  inexperienced  savers who  therefore require  a  high 
degree  of protection.  Many countries  have  accordingly adopted  special 
rules  for  the control  of collective  investment  undertakings. 
3.  These  Funds  are  usually operated  by  a  management  company  and  a 
depositary company,  on  the basis  of  a  contract  between  the two.  The 
contract  may,  as  in the United Kingdom,  constitute a  trust  deed  whereby 
the  depositary company  is  a  trustee.  France  is an  exception here,  as 
its mutual  Funds  are  joint  stock  companies with variable capital and 
there are  no  management  companies.  Generally the  management  company 
is  a  joint  stock  company whose  shares are  owned  by the  sponsors, 
a  bank,  a  life assurance  company  or perhaps  a  syndicate of  financial 
institutions.  The role  of the  management  company  is to superviSe the 
selection of  the portfolio,  the advertizing,  buying  and  selling of 
units  and  the  payment  of dividends  to subscribers.  The  role  of  the 
depositary  company  is to inspect  the advertisements,  see  that  the 
portfolio is safely kept  and  generally to act  as watchdog  for  the 
subscribers. 
- 14  - PE  46.46o;f:\;_n. 4.  Although  in  most  Member  States,  the  legal requirements  for  the 
operation  of  Funds ·are clearly defined,  they are  far  from  uniform. 
The  Commission wishes to coordinate  Member  States'  legislation  in this 
field  on  the basis  of  common  rules: 
(a)  to bring  about  more  uniform and  effective  safeguards  for 
savers. 
(b)  to ensure  more  uniform conditions of competition. 
Your  committee  agrees with these reasons. 
The  Community  must  be  concerned to give the  small  saver  both the 
protection he  needs  and the best  opportunities for  saving.  A  legislative 
framework  possessing  some  uniformity that  leaves  open  the possibilities 
of  innovation  is therefore  needed.  For  mutual  funds  are  no  longer the 
modest  yielding goldmine  they  once  appeared  to  be  to the  small 
investor.  Sad  experience has  destroyed  the  faith that  once  existed 
in equities as  a  hedge  against  inflation,  whilst  the  bond  market  has 
suffered  severe  fluctuations.  The  failure  of  I.O.S.  involved  a  million 
German  investors,  owing  to the  liberality of German  laws  at the time, 
and led to  a  loss  of  confidence  in  funds  in that country. 
(c)  to promote  at  Commu~ity level  more  thorough  penetration 
of markets  in transferable securities. 
The  proposed  coordlnat ion here  is also  a  step  on  the way towards  removing 
restrictions  on  the  free  movement  within the  Community  of units  of  CIUTS. 
Because  of  differences  in the  rules  of  Member  States,  there has  been 
reluctance  to allow  these units to  be  traded  freely across  borders. 
This  obstacle  to  the  openjng  up  of frontiers  must  be  rel\loved  before 
free  movement  of capita  1  can  be  established  in this  sector.  The  Commission 
intends  to present  a  proposal to the  Council  for  an  additional directive 
to ensure,  when  it becomes  feasible,  the  necessary  freedom  of  movement 
for  units  of  CIUTS  in  order that the present  directive  may  have  the 
maximum effect. 
If  a  European  capital  market  is ever to  be realized it w•ill  be 
essential to have  something  like  a  uniform  supervision of the  investing 
institutions.  At  this point  your  committee  must  stress that the proposed 
directive prepares  largely for  a  future  eventuality on  what  no  date  can 
as  yet  be  put;  the  day w'l:l.en·free  movemen_t  of capital  between  Member  States 
~an be  permitted. 
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a.  Scope  of the proposal 
5.  The  proposed  rules cover  the structure,  operations,  functions  and 
limitations  of mutual  funds.  Most  importantly they also cover their 
investment  policy and what  the public  must  be  told about  them. 
There  are  two  groups  of collective  investment  undertakings  for 
transferable securities: 
(1)  closed end 
(2)  open  end 
The  proposal  applies  only to the  latter as the  former  are less numerous 
and  in general  are  subject to company  law.  Open  ended  CIUTS  are of  two 
types: 
(a)  having  a  corporate structure  (investment  companies) 
(b)  having  a  non-corporate  structure,  i.e.  contractual or trust 
(unit trusts) 
Unit trusts are  institutions without  legal personality. 
The  Commission's  proposal  covers  only  investment  companies  or  unit 
trusts: 
/''" 
(i)  which  invest  in transferable securities  or retain. 
assets at  least  80%  of  the capital they collect 
as  liquid 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
which  accumulate this capital  by means  of  offers to the public 
which  operate  on  the principle of risk spreading 
whose  units are  or have  been  issued continuously or  in  blocks 
at short  intervals and/or  are directly or  indirectly repurchased 
or  redeemed at  the  request  of  the holder  using the assets of 
these  undertakings  (Article  2) 
b.  Principles of coordination 
6.  The  proposal requires the  Member  States to apply  a  number  of  minimum 
rules to CIUTS  situated1  on  their territory,  regardless of whether  they 
1  CIUTS  are  situated,  for  the purposes  of  the proposal,  in the  Member 
State  in which  their  management  is effectively carried on  (Article  3) 
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if of general  application and  not  in conflict with the provisions  of  the 
directive,  may  also· be  applied to  such  CIUTS,  but  not to those  situated  in 
another  Member  State  (Article  1).  CIUTS  will therefore,  as  a  general rule, 
be  governed  exclusively by the  legislation of  the  Member  State  in which  they 
are  situated.  This  legislation must  comply with the  minimum  rules  laid  down 
in the proposa  1 . 
A  CIUTS  must  seek  authorisation to trade  from the competent  body  in the 
Member  State  in which  it  is  situated  a~d.  once  it has  obtained this,  it will 
be  able to marke.t  its units  in any  Member  State without  further  authorisation. 
The  body granting the authorization  must  supervise the activities throughout 
the territory of  the  Community  of  CIUTS  situated  on their national territory 
(Article  58).  There  are  two  exceptions to this general principle.  They 
concern: 
(a)  provisions  governing capital movements. 
(b)  marketing  of units. 
The  proposal provides that when  units  of  a  CIUTS  based  in Member  State A 
are marketed  in  Member  State  B,  the  latter may  apply its own  marketing 
regulations.  The  competent  body  in  the  Member  State where  the units are 
marketed will supervise the application of  marketing regulat·ions.  Such 
regulations  must,  howe'Ier,  be  applied  in  a  non-discriminatory manner  and 
may  not  impose  on  CIU'l'S  based  in another  Member  State stricter conditions 
than  those  envisaged  in Article  55  of the proposal. 
/' 
c.  Contents  of _the  p_r:oposal 
7.  The  proposal contains  rules relating to: 
A)  Structure of  unit trusts  and  investment  companies 
Some  examples  are: 
( i)  activities of  the  man~gement company to be 
confined to the  management  of the unit trusts 
(Article  8) 
(ii)  supervision  by the  depositary company  of certain 
act.ivities  of  the  management  company  or 
investment  company  (Article  10) 
(iii)  depositary company to have  its registered office 
in the  same  Member  State as  that where  the  CIUTS 
is situated,  or  be  established  in,  or have  a 
centre  of activity in,  that  Member  State if it 
has  its registered office  in  another  Member  State 
- 17  PE  46.460 /fin. (iv)  depositary company  to be  responsible  for  the 
custody of  the transferable securities and  liquid 
assets constituting the assets of the  CIUTS 
(Article  10) .  (It  is to be  noted  that the depositary 
company has  less extensive responsibilities than the 
depositary company  of the unit trust). 
B)  Composition  of the  assets  of  the  CIUTS 
C)  The  investment  policy of  CIUTS  (Articles  25-30) 
D)  Information to be  disclosed.by CIUTS  (Articles 31-40) 
E)  General  obligations to  be  fulfilled  by  CIUTS  (Articles 41-53) 
F)  CIUTS  which  market  their units  in  a  Member  State other than 
that  in which  they are  situated  (Articles  54-57) 
G)  The  duties  of the  body  responsible  for  authorising and 
supervising the  CIUTS  (Articles  58-62) 
H)  The  setting up  of  a  liaison committee  to be  composed  of 
representatives of the  Member  States  and the  Commission 
(Article  66).  The  task of  the committee will be to facilitate 
consultation  between  Member  States relating  in particular 
to practical problems  encountered  in  implementing the 
directive  and  to the stricter or  additional  requirements 
of the  marketing  rules which  Member  States  may  apply under 
the directive.  The  committee will also advise the  ,.,. 
Commission  as necessary on  additions  or  amendments  to the 
directive. 
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a. 
OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE  PROPOSAL 
General  Principles 
8.  Your  committee  suggests  that  any  criticism of the proposal 
should be  made  with  a  certain amount  of modesty.  When  account 
is taken  of  the  differences  in the operation of CIUTS  in the 
Member  States  one  realises that expert  experience is necessary 
to  evaluate fully the  wisdom  of the Commission's  proposal. 
Parliament has  in  fact  come  in at  a  late stage  in  a  very complex 
debate which  na~ional and  international organisations  represent-
ing  CIUTS  have been  engaged  in with officials in Member  States 
and with  the Commission. 
g.  It would be  preferable for  the words  "of the open  ended type" 
to.be added to the title of the proposal  as it in fact  deals  only 
with undertakings  of this  sort. 
10.  On  page  8  of the  explanatory memorandum  the Commission has 
set out  a  number  of  objectives  which  the proposal  is designed to 
achieve.  It appears  that all these objectives  are  regarded as 
being of  equal  importance. 
11.  The  Commission  considers  that if the proposal  were  not 
sufficiently strict  so  that  savers  in the Community were not 
sufficiently protected,  the directive would  fail to  achieve its 
purpose. 
12.  The  Liaisoh' Committee  is provided for  in Article  66  of the 
proposal.  Its task is to  facilitate the  implementation of the 
directive  through  consultation between  Member  States,  particularly 
where  practical problems  arise  ;  to facilitate consultation as  regards 
the stricter or  supplementary requirements  and the marketing rules 
which  Member  States may  impose  ;  to advise the  Commission,  if necess-
ary,  on  additions or  amendments  to  the  directive.  The  Committee is to 
be  composed  of  representatives of the Member  States  and the  Commission 
and to be  presided over by  a  representative of the Commission,  which 
will  also  supply the Secretariat. 
This  Committee  should make  a  very  valuable  contribution to the 
smooth  implementation  of the  directive,  in  view of the considerable 
differences  between the legislation of Member  States which will  remain 
in existence.  It therefore has  important work  to  do.  The  details 
given  in  r.elation  to  the  Committee  in Article  66  are somewhat  incom-
plete,  as  Annex  C  to  the  proposal  shows.  The  Commission,  however, 
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will be settled at the first,  or subsequent,  meetings.  Your committee-
hopes  that the  Committee's  first meeting will be held as  soon  as 
possible after the directive  comes  into force  and that members  of 
professional bodies will be  able to participate in all meetings  of 
the Committee. 
13.  The  objection has  been  raised that the fact that a  Member  State 
may  apply its own  marketing  regulations  to undertakings  situated in 
other  Memb~r States means  that  two  systems  of  law will be  applied to 
undertakings  marketing their  shares  or  units  in  a  country other than 
that  in which  they  are situated.  This  is an  important  derogation  from 
the principle of  the directive whereby  a  single set of legal  provisions 
will apply  to undertakings  located in any  Member  State. 
Nevertheless,  your committee  accepts the  Commission's  explan-
ation that this is inevitable in  view of the existing divergencies 
between marketing  regulations in the Member  States. 
The  Liaison  Committee  should be most useful here  and Member 
States  are  also directed to  cooperate with  each other in the applic-
ation of the directive. 
The  Commission  also  considers that this problem  should be  dealt 
with more  extensively so  that marketing  regulations  concerning trans-
ferable  securities as  a  whole  may  be  coordinated  (see first paragraph, 
page  11  of the explanatory memorandum). 
,-
The  Commission  is working  on its further  directive concerning 
transferable securities generally and your  committee  hopes  that 
the further  proposal will not be  too  long  delayed. 
14.  The  cornmitteesuggests  that  a  proposal  similar to the  present 
one  for  the coordination of  laws,  etc.  relating to property funds 
should_be  drawn  qp  as  soon  as  possible. 
15.  _The  Economic  and Monetary  Affai~s Committee has  also  commented 
in its  opinion that the  scope  for  harmonization is too  limited, 
partly because of the  important  derogation  from  the general principle 
already mentioned,  and partly because of  numerous  further  derogat-
ions,  e.g.  Article  67  (l)  and  (2). 
~  20  - PE  46.460/fin. b.  Individual Articles 
16.  Article  1  (2)  This  seems  to be  badly worded.  The  provisions relating 
to  the  movement  of capital to which  reference  is made,  are  provisions  of 
national  legislation.  This'should be  made  clear.  Secondly,  the  phrase 
'a Member  State shall not  apply any provisions whatsoever  to CIUTS  situa-
ted  in another  Member  State  or  to the  units  issued by  such  CIUTS'  reads 
rather  oddly.  There  can  be  no  question  of  a  State's applying its national 
legislation to  a  CIUTS .or  its units  situated  in  ano"ther  Member Btate  un-
less  that  CIUTS  is operating  in  the  first  Member  State.  The  Article 
might be  reworded  as  follows  so  as  to  make  the  meaning  clear  'Subject 
to its national provisions  relating to the  movement  of capital  and  to 
Articles  55(1)  and  61(2)  of this  directive,  Member  State  A  shall not 
apply any provisions  to  CIUTS  situated  in Member  State  B which market 
their units  in  Member  State  A  or  to  the  units  issued by such  CIUTS'. 
17.  Article  5  (1)  :  The  wording  'such authorization shall be valid for 
all the  Member  States'  seems  unsuitable.  It wo~ld be preferable 
to  say  'a Cill'l'S  once authorized  may  operate  in all the Member  States 
witho11t  lurl.ilnr  <Hrlilor·iz<tL:i.on'. 
' 
18.  Article  5  (3)  Your  committee  wonders  why  the rule set out here 
should not  apply  in all cases  to the Depository Company.  Even 
if notification  i·~,given to other authorities,  they might  not 
necessarily pass it on  to the  competent  authorities  referred to 
here whose  information would thus be  incomplete. 
19.  Article 15  :  The  wording of the first part is rather strange  and 
might  perhaps  read better as  follows  :  'only the Management  Company 
and the unit holders  may  make  a  claim against  the assets of a  unit 
trust'. 
20.  Article  19  The  Economic  and  Monetary Affairs  Committee  has 
raised the question of .the  lesser duties  assigned to the Depository 
Company  of  an  Investment  Company  by  comparison with the Depository 
Company  of  a  unit trust.  The  Commission has  said  (page  17  of the· 
explanatory memorandum)  that this is because 
(a)  unit holders  in  Investment  Companies  are able to  exert 
direct  influence  and  control  over the management  of such 
a  company  by taking part  in meetings. 
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holders  and the shareholders  of the  Investment  Company 
are the  same  people. 
Your  committee  is  inclined to accept what  is said by the 
Commission here,  but the point has  been made  that the opportunities 
to exercise direct  influence and control by taking part in meetings 
are of  a  theoretical nature. 
21. Article  25  (2)  :The Commission  should perhaps  consider going  into 
detail  concerning  the  application of the  percentages laid down  in 
this Article. 
22.  Article  2'\  (3)b  :  These provisions  are apparently very complicated 
and it is worth noting that they are,  in  fact,  designed to  cover 
a  specific case  :  that of  investments  in Brazil. 
23.  Articles  27  to  30  inclusive  :  As  regards  these  articles it should  be 
pointed  out  that  the  various  figures  concerning the  assets of  CIUTS 
have  been based  either on  general  practice  in  the  Member  States,e.g. 
Article  26(1).
1 or  on  a  compromise,  e.g.  Article  27.  Page  19  of  the  ex-
planatory memorandum  has  an  important  explanation  on  the  links  in  the 
matter of figures  between Articles  2  and  25  of  the  proposal. 
24.  Articles  27  (2)  :  The  figure  given here appears  somewhat  low.  The 
/',  .. 
main  risk here  for  investors is that of  double  charging of  costs 
butthis  is  in  any  event  prohibited by  paragraph  2.  There  may  be 
cases  where it is very  useful  for  a  fund  to be  able to  invest in 
another  Fund managed by  the  same  management  or  company,  in order 
to take  advantage of particular expertise and  specialisation.  Your 
committee  ,  therefore,  considers  that the  figure might  safely be 
raised to  15%  here. 
25.  Article  30  :  So  that  managers  are not  compelled to  dispose  immediately 
of securities causing  an  excess  above  the  1~/o permitted by this Article, 
which  might  not  necessarily be in the interest of investors,  it would 
be preferable to  allow a  period of time,  for  example,  six months,  during 
which this might  be  done. 
26.  Article  31  The  publication of  so  many  reports will be  expensive  for 
CIUTS  and  your  committee  wonders  whether  an  annual  one only would  not 
be  sufficient. 
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badly worded.  Reference to  'a two  month  period'  suggests  that that is 
the period specified in paragraph  2  for  the  annual  report,  but  a  delay 
of  four  months  is allowed  for  publication of the  annual  report  so  the 
reference  must be  to the  two  month  period for  the  second half-yearly 
report.  This  is  not clear.  The  paragraph  should  therefore  be  reworded 
as  follows  :  '  ... if the  annual  report  for  that  financial  year  is  pub-
lished during  the  two  month  period which  is prescribed for  publication 
of  the  second half-yearly report' 
27.  Article  36  :  Your  committee  suggests  that  the  persons  or bodies 
appointed  should' inspect  and  check'  the  financial  data,  as  this 
phrase  more  accurately defines  the  work  which  they would  normally 
be  expected  to do. 
28.  Article  37  :  A  question has  been  raised as  to  the time at which  the 
CIUTS  is to  take the comments  of  the  competent  authorities  into  account. 
The  Commission  envisages  that  this might  be  the following  report if the 
comments  refer to matters  of presentation or the information to be  given, 
etc.  If e·rrors  have been  noted by the competent  authorities,  these 
should be  rectified by  the  issue of  a  corrigendum.  This  seems  reasonable. 
/'' 
29.  Article  41(1)  The  committee  proposes  the  insertion of  a  provisional-
lowing  'back-to-back'  loans  for  the  purpose  of borrowing  foreign  currency 
in order  to  purchase  foreign  securities,  as  the  explanatory memorandum 
states  that such  loans  are  permitted. 
30,  Article 41(2)b:It  appears  that the  Commission  envisages  here  a  wide 
interpretation of the word  "business"  to cover all operations  of the 
CIUTS.  The  occasions  for  such  borrowing  would,  the  Commission  suggests, 
be of themselves  limited. 
However,  it would be  preferable in the interest of investors to restrict 
this borrowing  to that which  is  needed for  the acquisition of only those'· 
buildings which  the  CIUTS  must  have  in order to  operate.  If any  latitude 
were  allowed there  could be  some  danger  of buildings being  acquired as 
an  investment  which  would  change  the character  of  the  fund.  Your 
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in this  sense. 
31. Article  50  :  Your  committ•·e  proposes  that it should be  provided 
that the  persons  specified  in  this Article should not  act as 
parties to transactions  effected on .behalf of  a·  CIUTS  either 
directly or indirectly. 
32. Articles  54  and  55:  It would  seem  more  logical if the order  O·f 
these Articles were  inverted. 
33. Article  61(2)  :  Your  committee  wonders  what  the measures  which 
are referred to here  might be  and against whom  they would be taken 
as  the  CIUTS  in question would  not be  situated in the Member  State 
which  would have  to tqke  the  measure:;;.  Certainly,  the  CIUTS  in 
such  circumstances  would  be  providing  a  financial  service in that 
'  Member  State in order to comply  with  the  provisions of the directive. 
But  it would  not  necessarily be  established there  a's  the  financial 
service may be  provided  for  example  through· an  office in  a  bank. 
The  Commission  foresees  that  as  a  last resort the ·Member  State ·might 
stop the  CIUTS  from  marketing its units.  Where  the question of 
enforcement  is  concerned,  it is envisaged.that resort might be had 
to bilateral agreements  between Member  States. 
34.  Articles  63  and  64  On  the  question  of  the  derogations  provided  in 
these Articles  for  investment  companies  which  market  their units  ex-
clusively through  one .or  more  official Stock Exchanges,  the  committee 
considered whether  they were  dangerous  precedents detracting  from  the 
harmonization which  the directive  is designed  to  ensure  but decided  this 
was  not  the  case. 
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opinion has  proposed an  amendment  to Article  67  (2).  That  committee 
considers  that managements  of  CIUTS  which  also carry on business as, 
or in conjunction with, credit institutions or  insurance  companies  may not 
be given  access  to  information  about  any  company which might  influence 
policy in regard to investment  in that  company  and which would not be 
available to all shareholders  in that  company. 
It seems  to your  committee  that it is inevitable that such  information 
should be  acquired,  but  in the  absence of any  evidence that this is 
likely to  lead to abuses,  and in view of the difficulty of providing 
adequate safeguards  as  to the nature of which the Economic  and Monetary 
Affairs  Committee has  made  no  suggestion,  your  committee  does  not  feel 
inclined to support  the proposed  amendment. 
36.  Article  72  :  So  that the  CommJ.ssion  is kept  fully  informed,  this 
Article should be  amended  to  read  :  "Member  States shall ensure that 
the  Commission  is notified of the text of essential provisions which 
they  intend to  adopt  or  adopt  under national  law in the fields  covered 
by this directive". 
37.  The  Schedules· :  As  these  are of  a  highly technical  nature,  the Legal 
Affairs  Committee  does  not  propose to  deal  with  them.  It does,  however, 
ask the  Commission  to take account of the  comments  which have been or 
will  be  made  up3?  them by interested organizations. 
·:.J:. 
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38.  Some  of these omissions  have been  noted following  a  study 
of  the Standard Rules  for  the Operations of Institutions for 
Collective  Investment  in Securities,  prepared by the Committee 
on  Financial Markets  of the  OECD  (Paris,  1972). 
39.  No  provision has  been  made  for  the harmonization of 
administrative procedures.  If it is the case that these procedures 
vary  considerably  from  one  Member  State to  another,  this might 
cause problems  for  the CIUTS  marketing their units  abroad. 
40.  Nothing  is said about the  amount  of  fees  and  charges  save 
in Schedule A,  under  which  some  information  about  these is to be 
given  in the prospectus.  The  Commission  might  consider whether 
some  attempt  should not be  made  in  the directive to  ensure that 
these  do  not  vary  too greatly  from  one Member  State to another. 
The  fourth  rule of  OECD  provides  that an  investor must  be  able 
to  find out  exactly how  much he  is paying  and  for  what. 
41.  The  23rd rule of OECD  contains  a  prohibition on  various 
persons  from  doing business  with  the  fund.  Article  SO  of the 
proposal  contains  similar provisions but they  do  not  go  so  far, 
in that the  spouses  and children of the directors  and staff of 
the  CIUTS  are  not  included in the  scope of the Article.  The  OECD 
rule also  applies· to all persons  who  through affiliation,  are 
liable to  come  dtfectly or  indirectly under the influence of any 
person or body,  to  whom  reference has  already been made  in the 
rule:  It should also be  noted that Article  SO  provides  for 
exceptions  to  the general  rule which the  OECD  rule does  not. 
0 
v.  CONCLUSION 
0  0 
42.  Taking  into account  the  proposed  amendments  and  comments  set 
out  above,  your  committee  recommends  the  adoption by Parliament of 
this report. 
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Draftsman  Sir  Brandon  Rhys  Williams 
On  24  June  1976  the  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary Affairs  appointed 
Sir  Brandon  Rhys  Williams  draftsman. 
It considered  the  draft opinion  at its meetings  of  18  October  1976  and 
22  November  1976  a'nd  adopted  it unanimously  on  3  December  1976. 
Present  :  Mr  Viln  Der  llek,  cl«li.t:man;  Sir  nrandon  Rhys  Williams,  draftsman; 
Lord  Ardwick,  Mr  Artzinger,  Mr  Delmotte,  M1:  llansen  (deputizing  for  Mr  Knud 
Nielsen),  Mrs  Kellett-Bowman  (deputizing  for  Mr  Dykes) ,  Mr  Krall  (deputizing 
for  Mr  Achenbach),  Mr-Lange,  Mr  Leonardi,  Lord  Murray of Gravesend  (deputizing 
for  Mr  Thornley),  Mr  Normanton,  Mr  Nyborg,  Mr  Springorum  (deputizing for  Mr 
Burgbacher)  and  Mr  Suck. 
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The  aim of collective  investment  undertakings  is to gather together 
the  funds  of as  many  savers  as possible by  issuing units  and to  invest 
these  funds,  u·sing  the principle of risk spreading  in securities or  other 
assets. 
These  institutions offer savers  the advantage of  a  wide  spread of 
investments,  which  is often difficult for  the  individual saver,  in parti-
cular as regards  foreign  markets. 
To  safeguard the  savings of small,  often  inexperienced savers,  many 
countries  have  evolved.special rules relating to the activities pursued 
by,  and  the controls to be  laid down  in respect  of,  these  undertakings. 
There  is  a  clear  need to coordinate the differing  laws  in this field. 
This  is  important  to protect savers,  especially small savers,  in the 
community  and  also,  insofar as  competition will be  stimulated,  to afford 
them mora  advantageous  conditions  for  placing their savings.  The  pro-
posed directive would  represent  some  progress  towards  a  unified capital 
market,  in that  it.would help to foster  the  interpenetration of markets 
in transferable securities.  The  commission's work  in this field  can be 
seen  in  some  way  as  a  counterpart  to its work  in  the  fields  of credit 
institutions  and  stock exchanges1 ,  and  the Committee  welcome  this develop-
ment.  They  note,. however,  the  continuing  lack of any overall Community 
policy for  savings  and  hope  that the  Commission will soon  remedy this 
deficiency. 
The  Committee  have paid particular attention to the Commission statement 
that  "Coordination  is thu·s  a  prior condition for  establishing the free  move-
ment  of capital  in this sector".
2 
The  Commission  goes  on to point out that 
for  the envisaged coordination to be really effective  "the necessary measures 
must be taken  in respect  of movements  in parallel with the  implementation of 
the present directive". 2  The  Committee  look  forward  therefore with  especial 
interest to the directive which  the  Commission is preparing,  which  aims  at 
the removal  of  restrictions  on  the  free  movement  of units  of collective 
investment  undertakings,  and  hope  that the  European  Parliament will be  con-
sulted  on this before the  end  of 1976. 
1  For  the Committee's  views  on  the Commission  proposals  in these fields 
see the Scholten Report  (Doc.66/75),  their opinions attached to the 
Armengaud  Report  (Doc.l86/73)  and  the  Bangemann  Report  (Doc.236/76). 
Tho  Committoo  gonorally  speaking  welcomed  the proposals but felt they 
did  not  <JO  Car  nnouqh,  and  nH]rottorl  th21t  thoy  dealt with  very  limitod 
ar:oao. 
2  Doc.ll4/7G,  pago  7 
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The  proposed directive  is  concerned  only with  collective  investment 
undertakings  for  transferable· securities  ( CIUTS)  which  are open-ended. 
These  are  for  the most  part the undertakings normally known  as  unit trusts. 
It do~s not  extend  to  investment trusts, which  are  closed-ended.  The  latter 
are  much  less  numerous  and  by  their nature normally  fall within  the  scope  of 
company  law. 
There  are  included  among  the  CIUTS  other  than  of the closed-end type 
those  undertakings  with  a  corporate  structure  - the>t  is,  investment  companies 
which  are  similar  in  form  to public limited  companies- as well  as  the 
collective  investment undertakings  other  than with  a  corporate structure, 
i.e.  unit trusts proper. 
To  be  even  more  precise,  this directive only concerns  CIUTS 
- whose  object  is collective  investment  in transferable securities and 
liquid assets  of at  least  80% of tho capital they collect; 
- whicn  accumulate this capital by  means  of offers to the public  r 
- which  operates  on  the principle of risk spreading; 
whose  units are or  have been  issued continuously or  in blocks at  short 
intervals and/or  directly or  indirectly repurchased or  redeemed at the 
request of  the holder  using  the  assets  of  these  undertakings. 
Consequently the  following  are specifically excluded: 
- collective  investment undertakings  more  than  20% of whose  funds  are 
invested in assets other than  transferable securities or kept  liquid 
/'' 
(i.e. property funds,  holiday ·funds,  property development  funds,  etc.) 
-holding companies;. 
- investment  clubs,  etc. 
(b)  The  case  for  coordination 
'rhere  are  several objectives  which  this  coordina·tion directive  is 
df'signed  to  meet.  By  coordinating the national  legislation applying  to 
CIUTS,  it should be possible to render  the protection offered to savers 
more  effective at Community  level  and  provide  more  uniform safeguards  for 
all savers. 
Furthermore,  coordinating  the  legislation in question should also 
enable  the conditions of  competition  in which  the  CIUTS  operate to be 
improved. 
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movement  within  the  Community  of units of CIUTS.  It is thus  a  prior  con-
dition  for  establishing the  free  movement  of capital in this sector. 
With  this in mind,  the  present directive requires Member  States to 
apply  a  number  of minimum  rules to  CIUTS  located  in their territory. 
II.  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MINIMUM  COORDINATION  RULES  CONTAINED  IN  THE  PROPOSAL 
FOR  A  DIRECTIVE 
(a)  General principles underlying  coordination 
The  proposed directive is designed  to make  CIUTS  located  in any  Member 
St.ate  subject to  a  single set of  legal provisions,  regardless  of whether 
they operate in only  one  country or  throughout  the Community.  Thus, 
according to this directive,  CIUTS  in Member  States will be subject solely 
to the  legislation of the  Member  State in which their management  is effec-
tively carried on.  The  Member  State concerned must  comply with the mini-
mum  rules  laid down  in  the  proposed directive  (Article  1) • 
The  required authorisation  (Article 4h),  which will be  granted only 
by the  competent authorities of the  Member  State in which the CIUTS  is 
situated,  will be  valid for all the  Member  States. 
However,  by way of derogation  from the principle of a  single set of 
legal provisions,  Article  55  provides that the regulations for  governing 
t,he  marketing of CIUTS  units  and the  supervision of the application of 
these regulations will remain the reponsibility of  the authorities of the 
Member  State  in  which  the units are marketed.  This  derogation is,  in 
the  opinion of the Commission1 ,  'important'.  To  justify this  important 
limitation of the princxple of a  single set  of  legal provisions,  the 
Commission  points to the  'marked  differences'  between  the  Member  States 
in  this  field  and  the  need  to resolve  these  problems. 
Among  the general  principles  already mentioned,  the proposal  for  a 
directive  lays  down  a  number  of regulations  concerning the  structure,  the 
obligations  and  the  supervision of CIUTS. 
1
Doc.  COM  (76)  152  final,  page  10. 
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The  proposal  for  a  directive stipulates  (Article  8)  that  the activities 
of unit trust management  companies  must  be  limited to the management  of 
these trusts. 
However,  there  are  two  derogations  from  this decision:  the first 
(Article  67(1)  to allow Belgian  management  companies  to retain the right 
to  issue bearer certificates representing registered securities of other 
companies;  the  second  (Article  67  (2)  to,allow Irish, British and Dutch 
management  companies,  which  may  at the  moment  be  involved  in other activit-
ies  such  as banking or  insurance,  to continue these activities. 
In this  respect  the  committee  is of the  opinion that there must  also 
be  adequate  safeguards  to  ensure  that opportunities are  not  afforded  to the 
managements  of  CIUTS  which  <Jlso  c<~n:y  on  business  as  or  in  conjunction with 
credit  inslitut i.ons  or  insur<JtH'<'  companies  to  gain  access  to information 
ubout  uny  company  which  m.iqht  .int:luc'ncc  this policy  in regard to  invest.ment 
in  that  company,  other  than  information  simultaniously available to all 
shareholders  in that  company. 
Bearing  in mind  the  important role  (Articles  10 and  19)  which the 
depositary company  must  play  in protect'ing the saver  (safekeeping of 
securities,  day-to-day administration,  supervision of .the  management 
company's  or  the  investment  c.')rnpany' s  activites)  the proposal for  a 
directive similarly stipulates that  the depositary  company  must·  have 
its registered office  (or  place of business)  in the  Member  State where 
tho  CIUTS  is  locatp.d.  i.e.  in tho  Member  State where  the business  of 
management  is actually catTied on.  This  rule on  location is  intended  to 
ensure oCI'icionl  and  practicablo  nupnrvision of management  activites by 
tho  dopes ita  t·y  company. 
However,  it  shoul~ be  noted that Article  19  does  not  assign to the 
depositary  company  of  an  investment  company all the duties  of  the depositary 
company  of  a  unit trust  (i.e. Article 19  does  not  repeat the duties 
referred to in Article 10 (2)  (c)  and  (d))  because  the  unitholders  in an 
investment  company  are protected by  company  law. 
The  proposal  for  a  directive contains  a  number  of provisions relating 
to  the  obliqations  of  CIU'l'S  as  regards  the  composition  of their  assets, 
t'J,..it'  inv• :<Ill"'"'  I'"' i•"/•  ''""'·.,witt•!  I"'' i··y  nnd  thP.  information  they must 
prov i rJ, .• 
1ooc.  COM  (76)  152  final,  page  17. 
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up  their assets,  subject to the exceptions  listed  in Article  25(2)  (a 
maxmimum  of  10% in transferable securities other than those  referred to  in 
(1)  and  a  maximum  of  5%  in  such  items  as  gold  and  property) • 
These  maximum  limits represent guarantees against  excessive risks for 
unitholders. 
- ~~~~~~~~~~-E~~~~X-~!-~~~~ 
To protect savers,  Article  26(1)  stipulates,  for  example,  that a  CIUTS 
may  not  invest more  than  5%  of its assets  in transferable securities of the 
same  issuer  (principle of risk spreading). 
Article  27(1)  further  lays  down  that  a  CIUTS  may  not  invest  in all more 
than  10% of its assets  in units  issued by other  CIUTS.  Similarly,  so  as to 
prevent  a  CIUTS  from  pursuing  a  policy of gaining  control over  companies  in 
which it invests,  Article  29  provides that  a  CIUTS  may  not hold more  than 
5%  of the securities of the  same  category of an  issuer or have  more  than 
5%  of the total votes attaching to the securities of this  issuer. 
The  proposal  for  a  directive forbids  CIUTS  (Articles  41  and  70)  from 
borrowing,  except  for  the  repurchase of  redemption  of  units  or  for  the 
exercise of subscription rights.  However,  this ban  on borrowing  does  not 
apply  (Article  70)  to CIUTS  whose  fund  rules  included on  1  January 1976 
provisions  enabling  loans  to be  contracted for  investment. 
Moreover,  Article 48rof  the proposal prohibits CIUTS  from  carrying  out 
particularly speculative transactions  (uncovered dealings  in transferable 
securities). 
Articles  34  and  57  of the proposal stipulate those particulars which 
CIUTS  must  publish: 
- a  prospectus relating to  the structure of the CIUTS,  its objectives,  pro-
cedures  for  issuing  and  repurchasing  shares,  an  annual rep6rt and  two 
half-yearly reports. 
The  prospectus will be subject to prior checking by the  competent 
authorities while  the reports  may be  checked at a  later date by these 
authorities. 
Finally,  a  Liaison Committee  is to be set  up  (Article  66),  to facilitate 
consultation between the Member  States  on  the  implementation of this 
directive. 
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Consideration of  this  proJJo.sal  for  a  directive  leads  to the  following 
conclusions: 
1.  The  Committee  welcome  the proposed directive as  a  further  step towards 
the  achievement  of  a  unified Community  capital market,  but stress the 
importance  of  its being  followed  as  soon as  possible by  a  directive 
to  enable  units  of collective  investment  un<;lertakings  to circulate 
without  restriction; 
2.  The  proposal for  a  directive certainly contains  a  number  of  useful  and 
necessary provisions relating to  the  protection of  savers both  in terms 
of  the  structure  and obligations of crurs; 
3.  However,  the  scope  of the harmonisation  is  limited  since it does  not 
cover  tho  rules  for  marketing  units of CIUTS; 
4.  Moreover,  among  other  derogations  the derogation  (Article  67)  which 
permits  unit trust managements  to be associated with merchant banks 
permits the misapplication of  confidential  information to the dis-
advantage  of other shareholders.  This  danger  may be  averted through 
strict adherence to  investment  and banking traditions  in the principal 
capital markets,  but the  occasion  should  not be  lost to ensure that 
abuses  should  not be  allowed  to arise. 
5.  The  Commission  should initiate a  study of  the whole  problem of  insider 
trading,  including  professional  independence,  with particular reference 
to  the  objectivEVbf  establishing  a  united Community capital market; 
6.  Finally,  despite the  number  and  detail of the  provisions of this pro-
posal,  it can only be  described  as  limited  in  scope; 
7.  This  opportunity ·should also be  taken to  emphasise  the considerable 
delay  in  introducing  real  freedom of movement  in the capital market 
(inadequacies  stemming  from  the  limits of the text of the present pro-
posal)  and  even  more,  in establishing  a  Community  savings policy. 
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